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Abstract. This article takes up the proposal that action and expression enable 
perceptual knowledge of other minds, a proposal that runs counter to a tradition 
of thinking that other minds are special in that they are essentially unobservable. 
I  argue that even if we accept this proposal regarding perceptual knowledge, 
there is still a difference between knowing another person and knowing other 
things. I  articulate this difference by pointing out that I  can know another 
person by sharing knowledge with her. Such sharing is expressed in the use of 
the second-person pronoun. Thus, I argue, other minds are indeed special as 
objects of knowledge, but not in the way the tradition has supposed.
I. INTroDuCTIoN
Consider a  non-verbal, facial expression of emotion, such as Peter’s 
joyful smile as he plays with his newborn baby. Such an  expression 
enables knowledge of Peter’s state of mind; by seeing the smile on Peter’s 
face, a suitably equipped person can come to know that Peter is enjoying 
playing with his baby. In the epistemological tradition (in particular in 
its empiricist strand), knowledge of another person’s thoughts or feelings 
has been taken to constitute a problem separate from knowledge of the 
external world: one that remains to be solved even if we manage to properly 
account for and vindicate our knowledge of the external world generally. 
In according the so-called ‘problem of other minds’ such a special status, 
the thought that we don’t literally experience, see, or observe another 
person’s state of mind has been an  important assumption. on this 
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assumption, whatever kind of knowledge an expression such as Peter’s 
smile can yield, it cannot be perceptual or observational knowledge.1
This assumption also has a  long history of being questioned. 
recently, we find people who oppose this tradition of thinking about 
the epistemology of other minds and directly challenge its supporting 
assumption by claiming that actions and expressions of mental states 
precisely enable perceptual knowledge of the minds of others. Now, I will 
argue that the claim that actions and expressions can afford perceptual 
knowledge of other minds needs to be coupled with an acknowledgment 
of a  difference between perceptual knowledge gained from seeing 
a person’s action or facial expression, and perceptual knowledge of other 
kinds of object. I want to resist the assimilation of knowledge of other 
minds to knowledge of the external world generally.
The tradition has it that other minds present their own epistemological 
conundrum. I  want to articulate what I  take to be an  insight in this 
tradition, while not preserving the central thesis of the tradition. I join 
recent authors in rejecting the assumption that we cannot see, observe, or 
experience the mental states of others, but I shall argue that this is not the 
end of the story. There is nevertheless something special about knowing 
another person’s state of mind by seeing him perform intentional actions 
or express his states of mind, such as seeing Peter’s delight in his face.
What is special, I  will suggest, is that perceiving another person’s 
action or expression opens a person up to a form of knowledge which 
is not simply one-sided, but mutual or shared. Such knowledge is 
manifested by utterances in the second-person form, such as ‘You’re 
really enjoying this, aren’t you?’ When I know what someone is thinking 
or feeling on the basis of his expressions – such as when I know that 
Peter is enjoying playing with his baby from seeing his happy smile – 
this judgment contains the basis for me to address Peter (as ‘you’) 
and thereby shift my knowledge of him into a  new register. This new 
register is what I’m interested in outlining in this paper. my suggestion 
will be that knowledge from action or expression is a first step towards 
a meeting of minds; it is not merely one mind’s encounter with an object 
of knowledge.
1 In this paper I will not make a distinction between perceptual and observational 
knowledge. I will, rather, treat these notions as equivalent.
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II. We CAN obSerVe oTHer mINDS: ACTIoN AND eXPreSSIoN
The thought that the minds of others are essentially unobservable is 
a  recurring theme in the epistemological tradition, especially within 
empiricist epistemology. other minds are not observed but rather 
inferred, is the slogan. We see this notion in russell’s Human Knowledge – 
Its Scope and Limits, where he, embracing the classical argument from 
analogy, says that,
The behaviour of other people is in many ways analogous to our own, 
and we suppose that it must have analogous causes. What people say is 
what we should say if we had certain thoughts, and so we infer that they 
probably have these thoughts. (russell 1948: 501-502)
A similar and more recent formulation can be found in Paul Churchland’s 
Matter and Consciousness, where he says,
It is of course by observing a  creature’s behavior, including its verbal 
behavior, that we judge it to be a conscious, thinking creature – to be 
‘another mind’. From bodily damage and moaning, we infer pain. From 
smiles and laughter, we infer joy. From the dodging of a snowball, we 
infer perception. (Churchland 1988: 67)
We also find this theme as a  theoretical assumption in empirical 
psychology – it figures as a prominent motivation in J.b. Watson’s (1925) 
seminal case for behaviourism as the only viable method for a scientific 
psychology; and it reverberates in the prominent contemporary idea that 
thoughts about the minds of others form a theory, a so called ‘theory of 
mind’. At the core of this concept is the thought that mental states figure 
as theoretical postulates in an  evolving theory for explaining overt 
behaviour.2
The idea that other minds are essentially unobservable is, however, far 
from universally accepted. G.e.m. Anscombe famously claimed that we 
can see people’s actions. Very early on in her Intention, Anscombe says,
I am sitting in a chair writing, and anyone grown to the age of reason in 
the same world would know this as soon as he saw me, and in general it 
would be his first account of what I was doing; if this were something he 
arrived at with difficulty, and what he knew straight off was how I was 
affecting the acoustic properties of the room (to me a  very recondite 
piece of information), then communication between us would be rather 
severely impaired. (Anscombe 1957: 8)
2 See Davies and martin 1995 for an introduction to this concept.
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Anscombe’s thought in this passage is that when asked to describe what 
another person is doing, the first description that will come to mind is 
(at least in many cases) in terms of what the person is intentionally doing. 
There is an open-ended number of things Anscombe could truly have 
been described as doing at that moment; ‘affecting the acoustic properties 
of the room’ is one such description. This would not be a description 
under which what she’s doing is intentional, to use Anscombe’s own 
phrase. ‘Sitting in a chair writing’, however, is such a description; and it 
is, on her view, also what most people would say that she was doing just 
from seeing her. Anscombe, then, claims that people’s actions are a part 
of the observable world.
Now, when we describe what people are intentionally doing, are 
we describing aspects of their minds? Jennifer Hornsby, a philosopher 
building on Anscombe, argues that the answer is yes. She says that ‘one is 
not in a position to take a view of which things are intentionally done by 
people unless one has some view of their mental states’ (Hornsby 1997: 
127). The idea here is that a description of a person’s intentional action 
(a description under which the action is intentional), such as ‘Peter is 
doing the dishes’ or ‘Sara is practicing her guitar skills’, is not a description 
that is neutral with respect to how the person conceives of her situation 
and what her goals are in the situation. making a judgment to the effect 
that ‘Sara is practicing her guitar skills’ is to be committed to Sara’s having 
certain psychological properties: primarily the psychological property of 
taking herself to be practicing the guitar.
The quote from Hornsby does not present a complete argument for 
the observability of mental states. It just states a conditional: If we see 
what people are intentionally doing, then we see aspects of their minds. 
A traditionally minded epistemologist could just use the conditional to 
deny that we see intentional actions. That is, she could say that given that 
we don’t see psychological properties, we cannot see actions either. She 
could advance the suggestion that a judgment such as ‘Sara is practicing 
her guitar skills’ ought to be thought of as having two components 
corresponding to two different sources: one is the direct perception of 
Sara’s bodily movements  – perceived as it were purely, not under any 
psychological aspects or presupposing psychological concepts  – the 
other is a thought about the origin of those bodily movements based on 
an  inference from those bodily movements to the representations and 
aims that might have produced them.
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This two-component picture of our thoughts about the actions of other 
people is powerful, and I do not aim to provide a convincing argument 
against it here. my aim here is not to argue for the perceptibility of other 
minds. but one thing to note is that the epistemological assumption – 
under the pressure of Anscombe and Hornsby’s supposition that we do 
see people doing things and thus see how they represent the world – has 
now taken on the shape of a substantive philosophical thesis about what 
it is that we really see, and what we then can make of what we see. It is 
no longer a self-evident starting point. This thesis can then be contested 
both by questioning whether pure bodily movements are actually 
within the range of things people can see, and if they are, whether such 
perceptions would give us any basis for supposing that the movements 
have the specific mental origins that we take them to have.3
Another area where the traditional assumption has been questioned 
recently is with respect to expressions, in particular emotional expressions.4 
expressions of emotions make, according to some contemporary authors, 
the mental states they are expressions of perceptible. Such a view is put 
forward by mitchell S. Green in the monograph Self-Expression from 
2007. There he points out that,
[We] often suppose not just that we can determine that a  person is 
in a particular state of feeling; we also take ourselves to be capable of 
observing those feelings with one or more of our senses. We see the 
elation spread over one person’s face as they comprehend the excellent 
news; we hear the impatience in another person’s voice as they try to 
correct our misunderstanding; we feel the exuberance in a friend’s robust 
handshake. (Green 2007: 24)
Similarly to the claims I  quoted from Anscombe and Hornsby, these 
observations are not yet complete arguments against the traditional 
epistemological assumption. They merely point out that we seem, at 
least in some situations, not to care much for this assumption in the way 
3 See the same essay from Hornsby (1997: 93-111) for a  critical discussion of the 
appeal to bodily movements in the epistemology of other minds.
4 Not all expressions, it is plausible to think, are intentional actions. Think about 
a spontaneous outburst of laughter or a sudden grimace in response to a revolting smell; 
such things don’t seem to be done on purpose. Hence it is another area, rather than 
a subset of the first. one could in fact argue that expression should be thought of as the 
broader category that encompasses intentional actions. For a suggestion in this direction, 
see Finkelstein 1999: 92.
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we ordinarily describe our cognitive grasp on other people’s thoughts 
and feelings.
Green offers a  framework for fleshing out these observations (and 
thereby, as I  understand him, to begin to vindicate them). He thinks 
that we can observe another person’s emotion in its expression by that 
expression being a  part of the emotion it expresses. Just as the facing 
side of an apple – being a part of the apple – enables a person to perceive 
(not just the facing side of the apple, but) the apple, a smile, being a part 
of an emotion of happiness, enables a perceiver to see that someone is 
happy. Green says,
Someone who presents to me an apple from one angle has thereby shown 
me an apple even if I do not inspect its interior or its other side. The 
reason is that a sufficiently large portion of a side of an apple is, for normal 
human observers, not only itself perceptible but also a  characteristic 
component of the apple. (Green 2007: 86)
If we’re in the spirit of worrying about our access to other minds, we 
will find this analogy troublesome. An apple is a thing, and we can take 
a look at its other side or ‘inspect its interior’ should we please. but if we 
think of an emotion as a thing, and its expression as a part of this thing, 
we appear to be barred in principle from seeing its other parts (the parts 
that might seem to be the most essential). And we might then be inclined 
to re-iterate the traditional worry: don’t we somehow have to base our 
knowledge on an  inference from the part that we do see, to the other 
parts that we can’t in principle see?5
but perhaps we don’t need Green’s particular version of the thought 
that we see emotions, if we find the analogy at its base unpalatable. 
An alternative image is provided by rowland Stout, in an article where 
he invokes the idea of an  Aristotelian process in order to articulate 
how an  expression can make an  emotion visible. His thought is that 
an expression is an actualization of a power, a process which realizes the 
emotion. He says,
5 Green is not moved by this worry. He concedes that we cannot see all parts of 
an  emotion, but that this is in fact not peculiar to the case of emotions. We can see 
galaxies, Green argues, even when we cannot in principle perceive the black hole in 
their middle. (Green 2007: 89) but a galaxy is a quite special ‘perceptible object’ and it is 
difficult to feel that it can provide the assurance we need. If people are like galaxies and 
their minds the unobservable black holes at their centres, knowing them appears to be 
a quite sophisticated and theoretically laden matter.
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The mental state is the disposition, potentiality, mechanism or power. It 
is realised, actualised or manifested in a process of facial expression or 
other behaviour. What is perceived is not just the upshot of the process, 
but the process itself; you see the emotion playing out in someone’s face. 
This is like perceiving someone’s strength in their handshake. Their 
strength causes the firmness of grip but it is not some prior event or state 
that has to be inferred from it. The strength is present in the handshake. 
The cause is manifest in its effect. (Stout 2011: 137)
Stout argues that thinking of the expression of an  emotion in terms 
a process of realization of a power can make proper sense of the thought 
that we can perceive emotions in their expressions. For the expression 
is now not conceived of as a  thing or event, separable from the event 
of the emotion. Neither is it thought of as a part of a composite thing 
or event. rather, the expression is thought of as a  stage in a  process 
which is the emotion, being realized.6 This strikes me as a prima facie 
more appealing picture than Green’s of how it is that we can see another 
person’s emotion in its expression. but it requires that we accept that 
an emotion is a disposition and an expression its actualization; a thought 
we might find it difficult to swallow.
It is, however, also possible to reject the question that both Green 
and Stout appear to feel the need to answer: what is the metaphysics of 
mental states and behaviour such that we can see the former in the latter? 
We can argue that the thought that we can sometimes see what another 
person is, say, intending or feeling, can get traction without any general 
view of the nature of mental states and behaviour. All we need, from the 
perspective I’m now considering, is the thought that mental concepts are 
bound up with circumstances in our shared world. And in learning to use 
those concepts, facts about people’s intentions and feelings come within 
the reach of our conceptually informed experience. No metaphysical 
account of the relation between mental states and behaviour  – of the 
sort articulated in Green’s idea that expressions are parts of emotions 
or Stout’s idea that emotions are dispositions realized in behaviour – is 
then required. This would be to think of expressions and actions as 
conceptually related to states of mind, but not necessarily in the simple 
6 To fully make sense of the thought that expressions make emotions perceivable, 
Stout thinks we need to couple the thesis that the expression of an emotion is a process 
with the idea that acts of perceiving likewise are processes.
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or uniform manner suitable for a general account. Arguably this is, in 
outline, the view of the later Wittgenstein.7
The traditional epistemological assumption that other minds cannot 
be observed has, then, alternatives.8 The question is whether accepting 
such an alternative also means that we have to give up the traditional 
idea that knowledge of other minds is special. If we embrace the idea that 
other minds are indeed a part of our common, shared, and observable 
world, does this mean that knowledge of another person is just like 
knowledge of the movements of the clouds in the sky, the process of 
a tree falling to the ground, or the currents of rivers? I think the answer 
is no, and I will spend the rest of the paper explaining why. I will argue 
that seeing people’s actions and expressions, and thereby coming to 
know something about their minds, contains within itself the possibility 
of a form of knowledge that is different from perceptual knowledge of 
falling trees. This form of knowledge is radically peculiar to knowing 
another person.
III. ACTIoN AND eXPreSSIoN AS eNAblING 
A CoGNITIVe relATIoN To THe PerSoN
Imagine the following reaction to the preceding discussion about 
whether or not we can see other minds:
It is quite beside the point whether or not we can see other minds. The 
knowledge we gain from observing people and collecting facts about 
them is anyway not exemplary of what it means to know another person. 
To have ‘access to another mind’ does not mean to know something 
about a person, such as, ‘This person is happy’ or ‘That person intends to 
move a heavy table’. It means, rather, to have access to the person, of the 
sort we have when we’re speaking to the person and understanding what 
they are saying. If we are interested in what it means to know another 
7 I  do not intend this list of options for thinking about the perceptibility of other 
minds to be exhaustive. There is also, for instance, the entire phenomenological tradition 
and its ways of articulating this thought.
8 We should be careful not to confuse the claim that it is possible to see what others 
are intentionally doing or what emotion they are expressing, with the thought that it is 
always easy to do so. It is often a quite difficult matter. The point is, rather, that when it 
is difficult to figure out another person’s intention or feeling, say, what we have to go on 
in trying to interpret them is not psychologically neutral information about their bodily 
movements.
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mind, we should focus on describing what it is for two people to have 
access to each other in this sense. The debate about seeing or not seeing 
other minds is a red herring.
The aim of this section and the next is to elaborate this reaction (inchoate 
as it stands), and argue that, properly understood, we should take its 
suggestion to heart. I will do so first with the aid of a  recent essay by 
michael Thompson, and in the next section by turning to Stanley Cavell’s 
notion of acknowledgment.
I start by quoting Thompson:
one human being comes upon another and perceives her doing 
something, or observes her at it – he is setting up a camera, she is crossing 
a road, he is moving a pump handle. The enquirer knows by perception, 
by an intuition or Anschauung of the other as other, by observation of 
her, that the agent is setting up a camera or is crossing a road.
[...] In the first instance this empirical knowledge is demonstrative 
and third person in character. but the difference between the observer’s 
observational thought in the case at hand, and his thought in other 
cases of observed things happening, like trees falling down, comes next. 
The observer moves into what we might call a  cognitive relation with 
the agent herself and asks her why she’s doing it. He does not do this 
with falling trees. The mark of this cognitive relation is the use of the 
second-person, ‘Why are you doing A?’ That he addresses himself to 
the observed individual substance is already a  clue that something is 
different. (Thompson 2011: 206)
The topic of this passage from Thompson is knowledge of another 
person’s intentional actions. I want to highlight three claims he makes 
in it.
(1) Intentional actions can be known observationally.
(2) There’s still a difference between an observational thought about 
someone’s action and an  observational thought about, say, 
a falling tree.
(3) The difference is that an observational thought about someone’s 
intentional action contains the possibility of entering into 
a cognitive relation with the agent herself, a cognitive relation the 
mark of which is the use of the second-person ‘you’. In asking the 
person ‘Why are you moving the pump handle up and down?’ we 
show that have entered into a cognitive relation to the person.
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The first claim is simply an endorsement of the Anscombe/Hornsby view 
described above: we can perceive people’s actions. The second claim is 
that this is not all there is to our knowledge of another person’s actions. 
The third claim describes the difference, and it is on that claim I want to 
focus. For understanding the third claim, the key phrase is ‘enter into 
a cognitive relation with the person’. This cannot simply mean to come 
to know something about the person. We have that kind of cognitive 
relation to the falling tree as well. And this kind of cognitive relation was 
supposed to be different. So what could it mean?
Thompson doesn’t directly state in this paper what he means by this 
phrase. but what he does say gives us a clue: The mark of this relation is 
a second-person address: ‘Why are you doing A?’ What is special about 
a second-person address? one feature of this form of speech is that it is 
directed at a specific person, and it invites this person to communicate. 
It does so with the presupposition that the person is in a  position to 
recognize this invitation and respond to it appropriately. We might, then, 
conjecture that the cognitive relation with the agent Thompson has in 
mind here is one where, in the first instance, knowledge is somehow 
mutual or shared. In using ‘you’ in a question about what someone is 
doing, I both reveal to the person addressed what I already know about 
what that person is doing, and I  invite the person to share with me 
something I do not yet know.
To have shared knowledge, on the way I want to use the phrase, is for 
two people mutually to recognize a piece of knowledge, and recognize 
it precisely as a mutual piece of knowledge. If you and I share a piece of 
knowledge, I know that you know, you know that I know, we both know 
that we both know that we know, etc. using ‘you’ in an interrogative is 
to invite shared knowledge that has precisely this structure. but there’s 
something else that pertains to the cognitive relation to the agent 
Thompson is concerned with. The question ‘Why are you moving the 
pump handle up and down?’ is addressed to the person as an agent, not 
as another observer.
What does this mean then? It has to do with the fact that we expect 
the person to answer not by gathering observational information, or by 
submitting observational information already gathered. The expectation 
is that the person already knows the answer to this question, and does 
so not by observation. Hence the shared knowledge prompted by the 
question ‘Why are you moving the pump handle up and down’ is different 
from the shared knowledge enabled by the question ‘Hey you, why is that 
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tree falling down?’ (unless, perhaps, the tree is a part of the scenography 
for a  play, the addressee is the scenographer, and is thus in charge of 
making sure the trees are positioned correctly.) Another way of putting 
this thought (that the expectation is that the addressee can answer the 
question without observation) is that the question is an invitation for the 
person to articulate her self-conscious knowledge.
Thompson’s third claim was that the difference between an observa-
tional thought about a falling tree and an observational thought about 
a person’s intentional action is that the latter contains the possibility of 
entering into a cognitive relation with the agent. This claim can, then, be 
glossed as the idea that the difference is that the observational thought 
in the case of the falling tree is not a first step towards shared knowledge 
where one person is articulating her self-conscious knowledge. I cannot 
share a piece of knowledge about the falling tree with the tree, and if 
I do share it with another person, I  share it with the other person as 
another observer.9
Having arrived at this gloss on the claims from Thompson I’m 
interested in, I  will suggest that the three claims he makes can be 
transposed from the case of seeing another person’s intentional actions 
to the case of seeing another person’s expressions. Think about the case 
of Peter’s happy smile. If we go along with Green’s and Stout’s views, I can 
know that Peter is happy just from seeing his happy smile. And I might 
also see why he’s happy, such as when he is joyfully smiling when he’s 
playing with his newborn baby. but I  might also not see why Peter is 
happy, such as when he is thinking to himself and suddenly smiles. And 
in such a case, I do well to ask Peter, ‘Why are you so happy’ or ‘What 
are you smiling about?’ In asking these questions I don’t address Peter 
as a fellow observer, rather, I expect to be able to expand my knowledge 
of the situation just from receiving Peter’s self-conscious articulation of 
what he’s happy about. The second-person address is an  invitation to 
Peter to articulate his state of mind, and in this way to share with me 
a piece of knowledge.
It is, of course, not the case that all expressions elicit a second-person 
address, and thus move to the stage of shared knowledge, rather than 
9 The point in stressing the linguistic address and response is not, as I understand it, 
to claim that shared knowledge needs to be actually verbally articulated in each case. 
A  mutual look might in a  situation suffice to establish shared knowledge. The point, 
rather, is to claim that the knowledge is articulable. Therefore the cases where it is actually 
articulated are exemplary.
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mere knowledge of a  fact about the person. We usually don’t address 
strangers in this way. but the reason why we don’t is social and 
conventional. It would be unexpected and perhaps intrusive to ask 
a stranger laughing about something as you pass him in the street: ‘What 
are you laughing about?’, but it would be a comprehensible question. It 
would not be a comprehensible question, at least not if someone claimed 
to intend it as a real address, to ask a tree why it is falling. The fact that 
people’s expressions can confront us with the question of whether our 
relation to the person is such as to warrant a second-person address is 
itself a significant datum. Faced with someone’s expression we can ask 
ourselves: is this someone it is socially acceptable for me to address, is 
it someone I’m expected to address, or is it even someone I’m obliged 
to address (because not addressing the person would be insensitive or 
cold)? Falling trees are not eligible to be placed on the scale that ranges 
from the strangers to the intimates. (I will come back to this thought in 
the next section on Cavell.)
The thought, then, we get from transposing Thompson’s claims to 
the realm of expressions is that when we come to know that someone 
is happy from seeing her happy smile, the thought: ‘She’s happy’ is the 
first step to entering into a cognitive relation with the person. This is not 
the relation of a knower to an object known but of a knower to another 
knower, a person who has the capacity to self-consciously articulate her 
own states of mind. When we come to know that a tree is falling from 
seeing the falling tree, we are not in the first stage towards a cognitive 
relation of this kind with the tree. This, I  think, tells us something 
significant both about expressions and about knowledge of other minds.
If expressions can yield perceptual knowledge of another mind, this 
piece of knowledge, by contrast with perceptual knowledge of other 
things, contains within itself the possibility of a second-person address – 
a question using the second-person pronoun ‘you’. A rash on one’s arm 
makes one exposed as someone whose allergic reaction is there to be 
known. And a  sneeze makes one exposed as someone whose cold is 
there to be known. but a joyous smile or a puzzled frown makes a person 
exposed as someone with knowledge to share.
IV. CAVell AND ACKNoWleDGmeNT
According to the picture I’ve sketched, action and expression enable 
a cognitive relation to a person, and this is a type of knowledge crucially 
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different from merely knowing something about a  thing (such as 
knowing that the tree is falling from seeing it fall). In describing this 
relation, with Thompson, as a cognitive relation, we should not be misled 
into thinking that this relation is devoid of emotional and practical 
significance. A  puzzled frown makes someone exposed as someone 
who can be addressed with the question: ‘What are you puzzled about?’ 
but this question is, in the paradigmatic case, a concerned question. It 
is one that, say, signals recognition of a frustration and a preparedness 
to, if possible, provide an  explanation of an  unclear remark. (This is 
only an example; what people might want or need from another person 
in a  situation where they are expressing their emotions is of course 
quite situation and person specific.) Stanley Cavell offers a  concept 
for a cognitive relation to a person of the sort outlined in the previous 
section, namely acknowledgment, and he highlights its emotional and 
practical dimensions.
In his essay ‘Knowing and Acknowledging’, Cavell offers a  reinter-
pretation of the problem of other minds in the form it takes within the 
analytic philosophical tradition. one result of his re-working of the 
problem is the thought that other minds are special not in that they 
are particularly difficult to know (because, say, their properties are 
perpetually hidden from view), but in that the knowledge we’re primarily 
interested in when it comes to other minds is of a peculiar sort. Cavell 
calls this form of knowledge acknowledgment.10
Cavell’s starting-point in this essay is slightly different from mine. 
I  started by examining the assertion and denial of the claim that 
psychological features of people are a  part of the public observable 
world. The issue he, on his part, spends most time on is the sceptical 
dialectic starting from the idea that we cannot have (or feel) another 
person’s pain.11 but his diagnosis of this dialectic can be of use for our 
10 This thought was, of course, not a  ‘new’ thought in the history of philosophy. 
Arguably (by people more historically versed than I  am), versions of it can be found 
in for instance Hegel and Fichte, and perhaps also in levinas. but Cavell’s aim in this 
essay is to diagnose a  certain dialectic within the then current analytic philosophical 
discussion about other minds. New incarnations of this dialectic keep cropping up, 
and the discussion about whether or not we see other minds is one example. Given my 
interest in this discussion, I find that Cavell’s framework for articulating that thought is 
particularly useful.
11 ‘The sceptic’ is in Cavell’s thought not a particular philosopher or a representative of 
a doctrine. The sceptic is, rather, a conversation partner, someone whose position Cavell 
tries to occupy in order to give voice adequately to a progression of thought.
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problem. What he argues is that even if we try our best to give the sceptic 
what he says that he wants, namely to imagine a  situation where two 
people can have each other’s pain, it would be a disappointment to the 
sceptic. It would not be exemplary of knowing another person’s mind. 
one way of putting what such a situation would lack is the possibility 
of a mutual address using the second-person ‘you’. Two people who had 
each other’s pains would not be separate in the sense required for being 
able to respond in this way to the pain of the other. They could not say, 
for instance, ‘Is there anything I can do to help you?’ and mean any of the 
things we might mean by saying such a thing.12
What does it mean to give the sceptic what he says he wants, one 
might wonder? The way Cavell proceeds is by considering a  thought 
experiment, adapted from Alexandre Dumas’ novella The Corsican 
Brothers. In Cavell’s version of the story, the two brothers, First and 
Second, have a peculiar bond. Whenever First feels pain, Second feels it 
too. even when miles apart, Second feels pain in exactly the same place 
and with the same intensity as First does. moreover, Second never feels 
pain unless First does. Second doesn’t scream or grimace when he cuts 
himself; he hurts only when something has happened to First. Second’s 
pain is also a direct effect of First’s, there’s no damage on Second’s body 
in connection with the episodes of pain.
Cavell suggests that what we have here comes close to imagining 
a situation where two people feel the same pain. (There are, of course, 
a number of question-marks regarding what we are asked to imagine and 
whether we can form a coherent image on the basis of these premises. but 
if we dig in our heels too early, we’ll miss an important lesson.) Not only 
do Second and First have qualitatively the same pain – like two people 
who suffer from the same kind of headache – they have numerically the 
same pain. The sceptic ought, then, to be satisfied with the epistemic 
positions of the Corsican brothers; they should be a  good illustration 
of why our ordinary position with respect to each other is so frightfully 
inadequate. but, Cavell argues, they are not. Turning to the epistemic 
positions of First and Second respectively, Cavell wonders whether 
First’s knowledge of Second’s pain is of the kind that the sceptic appears 
to be asking for. The answer, Cavell thinks, is that First’s position with 
12 Cavell’s essay is critical of the way in which some of his contemporaries – exemplified 
by Norman malcolm and John W. Cook –  invoke ordinary language to refute the sceptic, 
while it tries to exemplify a different version of ordinary language criticism.
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respect to Second’s pain doesn’t look much better on inspection than our 
ordinary position with respect to others; it might even look worse.
It might look worse because the primary fact for First when he is in 
pain is that he is in pain. The thought might strike him that Second is in 
pain too, but it also might not. He might forget this in the midst of his 
own suffering. And even if he does remember, First is not in a particularly 
good position to respond to Second’s pain, since he is preoccupied with 
his own precisely during and to the same extent as First is, and hence 
is not the best person to respond to Second’s pain. Cavell writes: ‘every 
pain First feels is his. (This now means something in contrast to Second, 
none of whose feelings are his.) First knows what Second feels (and when 
and where he is feeling it) – but so can we know those things.’ (Cavell 
1969: 252)
but what about Second’s epistemic position? The problem here is that 
Second is not relevantly other to qualify for the description ‘knowing 
another person’s pain’. Since Second has no pain of his own, he can as 
well express pain by saying ‘I feel pain’ as by saying ‘He feels pain’. And, 
most importantly, we’re not quite sure what it would mean for Second to 
say to First: ‘You are in pain.’ It would hover between an expression of his 
own pain (Second’s), and a response to First’s. The distinction between 
the two individuals is, in this respect, blurred, and hence the possibilities 
for expression and response undercut. Hence Second’s knowledge isn’t 
quite knowledge that another person is in pain. Cavell says,
[H]is pain no longer contrasts with my pain, his has no further content, so 
to speak; ‘his pain’ no longer differentiates what he feels from what I feel, 
him from me; he is not other in the relevant sense. (Cavell 1969: 253)
If First’s position is not any better  – or even worse  – than ours with 
respect to Second’s pain, Second is not quite in a position to even know, 
or respond to, First’s pain as another person’s pain. So even though the 
sceptic thought that feeling another person’s pain was the requirement 
needed to really know another person’s pain, it turns out that even this 
wouldn’t satisfy him.
An intrinsic part of why this thought experiment is disappointing for 
the sceptic is because it removes the conditions for a genuine second-
person address. The Corsican brothers are not exemplary cases of 
knowing another person’s pain partly because they are not in particularly 
good positions to judge ‘You are in pain’ as a  response to the other 
person’s pain. For First, this is because ‘I’m in pain’ is the primary fact for 
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him, for Second this is because he is not relevantly separate from First. 
Cavell articulates two questions on the basis of the thought experiment:
but how shall we understand this wish for a response to my expressions 
(of pain, of any region of the mind)? Does it suggest that our concept of 
my knowledge of another is bound up with the concept of my freedom, 
an independence from the others, from all others – which I may or may 
not act upon? (Cavell 1969: 253)
Cavell’s response to the first question is to propose the concept of 
acknowledgment. And the answer to the second question his essay 
implies is yes. What leads Cavell to say that the concept of knowledge 
when we are considering other minds is different from the concept 
we use when we are talking about knowledge of mere objects, is that 
an exemplary expression of knowledge of another person is a concerned 
response to the person.
We can note, first, that the Corsican brothers do not have what I have 
above called shared knowledge. Shared knowledge, as I characterized it, 
was knowledge that required two people’s mutual recognition of each 
other. It is marked by the use of the second-person, such as in saying, 
‘Is there anything I can do for you?’ Just by their situation, the Corsican 
brothers do not have shared knowledge. It is, moreover, not clear even 
that they can have shared knowledge in precisely this sense, since ‘You 
are in pain’ in Second’s mouth, as we said, can’t exactly mean what it 
means for us. If we return to the theme of the very first section of this 
paper, there is no such inherent tension between the idea of seeing 
another person in pain, and having shared knowledge. but seeing is not 
sufficient for shared knowledge. I might see that ‘This person is in pain’ 
but unless I’ve responded to the person this knowledge is not shared. 
And shared knowledge, as I  understand Cavell’s point, is one way of 
describing the different concept of knowledge we have when other 
minds are concerned. If we remain at the level of the judgment ‘I see that 
this person is in pain’ we will not have captured in full what knowing 
another person means. We need to see that such a judgment contains the 
possibility of the response ‘You’re in pain, can I do something for you?’ 
to get the concept fully in view.
expressions, Cavell says in the quote above, come with a  wish 
for a  response. The response it wishes for is at once an  expression of 
knowledge, and an act of concern towards the person.
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It is not enough that I know (am certain) that you suffer – I must do or 
reveal something (whatever can be done). In a word, I must acknowledge 
it, otherwise I do not know what ‘(your or his) being in pain’ means. Is. 
(Cavell 1969: 263)
Acknowledging someone’s suffering, Cavell claims in this passage, is to do 
or reveal something. expressing compassion by saying ‘I know you are in 
pain’ is one example of an acknowledgment. but we ought not to be under 
the impression that acknowledgment is the tag for a  specific mode of 
response to another person, namely being empathetic or compassionate. 
And it would be odd to claim that we must be compassionate with 
suffering people, even if we hear the ‘must’ as an ethical ought. Clearly we 
are in fact not always compassionate, nor is it clear that we always ought 
to be. Cavell’s point is, rather, that knowledge of another person takes, 
paradigmatically, the form of knowledge that you are, say, suffering – and 
this means that the question how do I respond to you is always relevant. 
It is always on the table. When the knowledge is shared, in the sense 
outlined above, there is no escaping the relevance of what we do, say, and 
feel, in response to the person. Cavell explains,
So when I  say that ‘We must acknowledge another’s suffering, and we 
do that by responding to a  claim upon our sympathy’, I  do not mean 
that we always in fact have sympathy, nor that we always ought to have 
it. The claim of sympathy may go unanswered. We may feel lots of 
things – sympathy, Schadenfreude, nothing. [...] [Acknowledgment] is 
not a description of a given response, but a category in terms of which 
a given response is evaluated. (Cavell 1969: 263)
We can understand Cavell as saying, then, that an expression (of pain, say) 
calls for a response in the form of an acknowledgment, and this makes 
it the case that whatever one does in response, even if nothing, can be 
described and evaluated with respect to this call for an acknowledgment. 
And issuing an acknowledgment is, as I understand the concept, precisely 
what one does when one enters into a cognitive relation to a person in the 
way I’ve described here. An acknowledgment takes the form of a second-
person address, and it addresses the person not as a fellow observer but 
as a person who can self-consciously articulate her own states of mind. 
but it also addresses the person as someone who is possibly in need. 
What an expression potentially shares is not merely knowledge, but also 
circumstance, or plight.
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Does this mean that I (and Cavell) think that knowing another mind 
is intrinsically an ethical matter? It does, if what this means is simply that 
shared knowledge makes two people vulnerable to the needs, wants, and 
requests of each other, and so subject to the specific forms of evaluation 
that attaches to such vulnerability. Given that expressions open oneself to 
a cognitive relation with another person, an ethical claim might always 
present itself, say in the form of a recognition of a need.
Now, as the argument of this paper is structured it might be thought 
that I think of the cognitive and the practical/emotional response as two 
stages in a process. This is not the image I wish to convey. The idea is 
not that shared knowledge comes first, and then comes a practical and 
emotional response. rather, I would argue that a central characteristic of 
coming to a shared knowledge is that it is at once cognitive, emotional, 
and practical. It is expressed in a concerned question: ‘What’s that smile?’ 
or ‘How are you doing?’
one important consequence of thinking that knowledge of other 
persons can take the form of acknowledgment – shared knowledge that 
makes two people exposed and vulnerable to each other – is that we also 
note that this form of knowledge has its own anxieties and difficulties. 
(Considering the different aspects of this consequence is a  persistent 
theme in Cavell’s writings, in particular in Part IV of The Claim of 
Reason (1979).) There is no guarantee that a person will open up to me 
and share his knowledge with me by articulating what he is thinking 
or feeling, and there is no guarantee that if I  open up I  will get the 
response that I wished for. In this region of the concept of knowledge, 
we run up against the independence, frailty, and even potential cruelty 
of the other. In the face of these specific difficulties, it is no consolation 
whatsoever to point out that I  can see what the person is thinking or 
feeling. mere observational knowledge, if divorced from the possibility 
of acknowledgment, doesn’t give me what I want; it doesn’t correspond 
to my real interest. This is, we might think, a way of expressing an insight 
in the tradition of denying that other minds can be observed. What we 
can see is not by itself enough; we want the kind of knowledge that only 
comes with a mutual cognitive relation to the person. If we’re interested 
in giving an account of the way action and expression afford knowledge 
of other minds, this line of reasoning should make us qualify the idea 
that they enable perceptual knowledge of another mind. They do so, but 
they also and more importantly enable a cognitive relation between two 
people of the kind marked by an acknowledgment. The insight in the 
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epistemological tradition of thinking that other minds are special can, 
then, be formulated as follows: Happy people and falling trees can both 
be seen but only the former can be acknowledged.13
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